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WANTED: A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES 
ACT TO FOREIGN REWARD OFFERS 
Timothy E. Donahue* 
Abstract: In 1976, Congress sought to codify the application of sovereign 
immunity with the passing of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA). As foreign governments began to routinely act as participants in 
international commerce, Congress intended that the FSIA waive sovereign 
immunity when a foreign government engages in commercial activity that 
has a “direct effect” in the United States. This exception permits suits 
against foreign governments in U.S. courts when there is a breach a com-
mercial contract that directly affects economic interests in the United 
States. Under U.S. contract law, a binding unilateral contract may form 
when one party performs the acts requested in an open offer, such as pro-
viding the whereabouts of a wanted fugitive in return for a reward. A re-
cent Eleventh Circuit case, Guevara v. Republic of Peru, displayed the court’s 
inconsistent application of the FSIA’s commercial activity exception to fu-
gitive reward offers, and prohibits the judicial enforcement of these con-
tracts, even when offered by a foreign government and entered into on 
U.S. soil. The Guevara decision illustrates the unsettled interpretation and 
application of the FSIA by U.S. courts, and may have very damaging effects 
on U.S. participation in the pursuit of international fugitives. 
Introduction 
 Perhaps best epitomized by the “wanted” posters of nineteenth 
Century America, large cash rewards have commonly been used to so-
licit public assistance in the capture of dangerous fugitives.1 The legal 
concept of a fugitive reward as a contract is a relatively simple one, re-
plete with the notions of offer, acceptance, and performance that are 
well rooted in contract law.2 Nevertheless, when the pursuit of a fugitive 
 
* Timothy E. Donahue is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 See Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73, 73 (1875) (describing the widely proclaimed 
$25,000 reward offer for the arrest of John Wilkes Booth and his accomplices in the assas-
sination of Abraham Lincoln). 
2 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 29 (1981). 
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crosses international boundaries, such reward offers become subject to 
a more complicated legal framework.3 
 In a recent Eleventh Circuit case, Guevara v. Republic of Peru, the 
plaintiff sought to enforce a $5 million reward offer from the govern-
ment of Peru after he assisted in the capture of Vladimiro Lenin Mon-
tesinos Torres (Montesinos).4 After a lengthy journey through the fed-
eral courts, the circuit court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).5 The FSIA pro-
vides immunity to foreign governments from lawsuits in U.S. courts 
while codifying certain enumerated exceptions to immunity.6 One such 
exception allows for suits against a foreign government that has en-
gaged in “act outside the territory of the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act 
causes a direct effect in the United States.”7 Although the court con-
cluded in an earlier decision that Peru’s reward offer qualified as a 
“commercial activity” under the FSIA, it held that the offer did not have 
a sufficiently “direct effect” in the United States to merit the immunity 
exception.8 The correct interpretation of this direct effect require-
ment, however, has puzzled district courts since the FSIA was signed 
into law in 1976.9 The context of the Guevara case illustrates the incon-
sistent applications and interpretations of the “commercial activity” ex-
ception by federal courts.10 In November 2010, the Supreme Court de-
clined an opportunity to resolve this split amongst the circuits and 
denied the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari.11 
  The application of the FSIA has extended beyond simple interna-
tional business disputes and now includes criminal acts, as well as the 
pursuit of criminals.12 The Eleventh Circuit’s apparent reversal of its 
                                                                                                                      
 
3 See Guevara v. Republic of Peru (Guevara II ), 608 F.3d 1297, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(applying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to a reward offered by a foreign 
state), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 651 (2010) (mem.). 
4 Id. at 1300. 
5 Id. at 1302, 1310. 
6 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604–1611 (2006). 
7 Id. at § 1605(a)(2). 
8 Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1306, 1310. 
9 Joseph F. Morrissey, Simplifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: If a Sovereign Acts 
Like a Private Party, Treat It Like One, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 675, 677 (2005). 
10 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Guevara II, 608 F.3d 1297, (No. 10-389). 
11 See Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 131 S. Ct. 651 (2010) (mem.). 
12 Compare Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992) (holding that 
the commercial activity of government-issued bonds had a direct effect in the United 
States that waives FSIA immunity), with Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1302, 1310 (holding that a 
reward offered for the capture of a fugitive was a commercial activity, but did not have the 
required direct effect to waive FSIA immunity), and Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 
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previous decision in Guevara illustrates the unpredictability of FSIA ap-
plication and shows that a unilateral reward contract, performed in the 
United States, will not always be enforceable in U.S. courts.13 The con-
flicting decisions in Guevara have made apparent the need for courts to 
interpret the direct effect requirement as Congress intended and waive 
immunity when foreign governments act as marketplace participants in 
international commerce.14 By allowing the FSIA to prevent judicial 
guarantee of such unilateral contracts, a valuable tool of law enforce-
ment may be significantly weakened and global security placed at risk.15 
 Part I of this Note examines the factual and procedural back-
ground of the Guevara case. Part II discusses the legal framework of the 
FSIA and the law of contract that governs reward offers. It also exam-
ines current international fugitive rewards and security partnerships 
between the United States and foreign states. Part III applies the facts 
of Guevara to other FSIA interpretations and argues that foreign reward 
offers, accepted through performance in the United States, should be 
enforceable in U.S. courts. 
I. Background 
 During the 1990s, Montesinos served as Peru’s intelligence chief, 
as well as an advisor to former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori.16 
Dubbed “Peru’s Rasputin” because of his substantial influence over the 
President, Montesinos allegedly used his powerful post to commit a 
myriad of crimes including arms and drug trafficking, extortion and 
“more than a few murders.”17 Although critics accused Montesinos of 
corruption for years, in September 2000, hundreds of videotapes sur-
faced that depicted him engaging in various criminal acts.18 During the 
public outcry that followed, President Fujimori disbanded the National 
                                                                                                                      
F.3d 869, 875 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that an illegal contract can still qualify as a com-
mercial activity, having a direct effect in the United States that waives FSIA immunity). 
13 See Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1311 (Cox, J. dissenting) (“Most importantly, the Guevara I 
court explicitly decided that there was no immunity available to Peru under the FSIA.”). 
14 See Morrisey, supra note 9, at 703. 
15 See Guevara v. Republic of Peru (Guevara I ), 468 F.3d 1289, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“The holding Peru asks us to reach would jeopardize not only its vital interests but those 
of every country that offers rewards for information, including this country.”); Guevara v. 
Republica Del Peru, No. 04-23223-CIV, 2008 WL 4194839 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2008), rev’d, 
608 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 651 (2010) (mem.). 
16 Guevara v. Republic of Peru (Guevara I ), 468 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006). 
17 Id.; Opinion, Peru’s Spy Chief in Exile, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2000, at A22. 
18 Guevara I, 468 F.3d at 1292. 
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Intelligence Service and effectively resigned the presidency.19 Before 
Montesinos could be brought to justice, however, he managed to es-
cape Peru aboard his yacht, the Karisma, embarking to points un-
known.20 The hunt for the former spy chief garnered worldwide atten-
tion, with claims that he underwent facial reconstructive surgery and 
placed nearly $800 million of illegally obtained funds in various off-
shore accounts.21 In an effort to generate new leads, Peru’s Interim 
President, Valentin Corazao, issued an Emergency Decree in April 
2001, offering $5 million to anyone providing “accurate information 
that will directly enable locating and capturing . . . Montesinos.”22 
 After fleeing Peru, Montesinos eventually reached Venezuela, 
where he placed himself under the protection of José Guevara, a for-
mer Venezuelan intelligence officer.23 Guevara provided a safe house 
for Montesinos and also served as his personal representative.24 While 
seeking access to one of Montesinos’ U.S. bank accounts, Guevara 
threatened to physically harm a Miami banker via email.25 In June 
2001, when Guevara traveled to Miami to meet the banker in person, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Guevara on federal 
charges stemming from those threats.26 Aware of Guevara’s connection 
to Montesinos, the FBI offered to drop the charges if Guevara would 
provide information on his whereabouts.27 Additionally, the agents no-
tified Guevara of Peru’s $5 million reward offer, which had been widely 
publicized.28 Agreeing to the offer, Guevara then informed the FBI of 
Montesinos’ location, and offered to have his associates deliver the fu-
gitive to Venezuelan authorities.29 The FBI relayed this information to 
Peruvian and Venezuelan officials, who successfully apprehended Mon-
tesinos after he spent nearly eight months on the run.30 
                                                                                                                      
19 James Brooke, Peru’s President Calls for an Election and Will Not Run, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
17, 2000, at A11. 
20 Larry Rother, For Peru Ex-Spy Chief, on the Lam, a Trail of Intrigue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 
2000, at A18. 
21 Id. 
22 Guevara v. Republic of Peru (Guevara II ), 608 F.3d 1297, 1301 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(applying the FSIA to a reward offered by a foreign state), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 651 (2010) 
(mem.). 
23 Id. at 1302–03. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1301. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1301. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1304; Clifford Krauss, Former Spy Chief of Peru Captured in Venezuela Lair, N.Y. 
Times, June 25, 2011, at A1. 
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 Subsequent to this highly publicized arrest, both Peruvian and 
Venezuelan intelligence services claimed credit for its success; however, 
Peru also openly acknowledged the FBI’s role in facilitating Montesi-
nos’ capture.31 Following his release, Guevara submitted his claim for 
the reward to Peru’s Special High Level Committee (SLHC), the gov-
ernmental committee authorized to dispense it.32 The SLHC, however, 
refused to pay him.33 
 After Peru refused payment, Guevara filed suit in Florida state 
court seeking enforcement of the reward offer.34 After removing the 
suit to federal district court, Peru moved for dismissal under the 
FSIA.35 The district court agreed, dismissing the case on the grounds 
that the reward offer did not qualify under any of the FSIA’s excep-
tions.36 On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that 
Peru had “‘ventured into the market place’ to buy the information 
needed to get its man.”37 On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Guevara, and en-
tered a final judgment in the amount of $5 million plus interest.38 In 
Peru’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit revisited Peru’s FSIA claim, al-
though this time on different grounds.39 
 Although the circuit court originally decided that Peru’s reward 
offer constituted a commercial activity, its first decision remained silent 
on the applicability of the remaining language of the FSIA.40 In the sec-
ond appeal, the circuit court took up this inquiry and applied the three 
jurisdictional nexuses listed in § 1605(a)(2) to determine whether such 
commercial activity waived immunity.41 For waiver to occur, 
§ 1605(a)(2) requires that the case be based upon (1) a commercial 
activity carried on within the United States, (2) acts performed in the 
United States in connection with commercial activity elsewhere, or (3) 
                                                                                                                      
31 How Montesinos Was Betrayed, BBC News (June 26, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/americas/1408442.stm. 
32 See Guevara v. Republica Del Peru, No. 04-23223-CIV, 2008 WL 4194839, at *2–3 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2008), rev’d, 608 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 651 
(2010) (mem.). 
33 Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1301. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1302. 
36 Id. 
37 Guevara I, 468 F.3d at 1299 (quoting Hond. Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Hond., 
129 F.3d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
38 See Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1305. 
39 Id. at 1307. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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acts performed in the United States in connection with commercial ac-
tivity elsewhere that causes a direct effect in the United States.42 Al-
though the district court assumed that the circuit court performed this 
analysis in its original opinion, the Eleventh Circuit found that the issue 
had been implicitly left open and performed the inquiry in its second 
decision.43 
 Applying the nexus analysis to Guevara, the circuit court con-
cluded that under the first prong, the commercial activity of the reward 
offer did not take place within the United States.44 It reasoned that be-
cause the reward offer was created and administered by the SHLC in 
Peru, the commercial activity itself had not occurred in the United 
States.45 Analyzing the second prong of the nexus, the court held that 
Peru’s telephone call to the FBI agents in Miami, in which Peru re-
stated the availability of the reward, was not sufficiently “in connection 
with” the commercial activity of the reward offer.46 It held that if such a 
phone call could meet the “in connection with” requirement of the 
second nexus, then almost any statement made in the United States 
regarding the commercial transaction would waive immunity.47 Because 
such an interpretation would run counter to the principle that a for-
eign state may only waive immunity either explicitly or by implication, 
the circuit court declined to find that such a minor action met the re-
quirements of the second prong.48 
 In its analysis of the third and final prong, that acts performed in 
connection with the commercial activity have a direct effect in the 
United States, the court applied the holding of Harris Corp. v. National 
Iranian Radio & Television, which required that the effect be “suffi-
ciently ‘direct’ and sufficiently ‘in the United States’ that Congress 
would have wanted an American court to hear the case.”49 The court 
also employed a minimum contacts analysis analogous to that used to 
determine personal jurisdiction.50 Under this analysis, the Eleventh 
Circuit rejected Guevara’s claim that his acceptance of the reward offer 
                                                                                                                      
42 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
43 Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1307. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1307–08. 
46 Id. at 1308. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1309 (quoting Harris Corp. v. Nat’l Iranian Radio & Tele-
vision, 691 F.2d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
50 See id. at 1310. 
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while in FBI custody satisfied the direct effect requirement.51 Moreover, 
the court rejected Guevara’s contention that Peru’s non-payment of the 
reward caused a direct effect in the United States, declining to allow a 
“negative activity” to establish a direct effect waiver of the FSIA.52 Fi-
nally, the court also held that Guevara’s arrest in the United States was 
not a direct effect of Peru’s reward offer, as the arrest was instead a 
consequence of his criminal behavior.53 The majority reversed the dis-
trict court’s summary judgment decision and remanded the case with 
the instruction that it be dismissed.54 
 In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Cox criticized the court’s 
holding that the issue of sovereign immunity was not addressed in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s first decision.55 Judge Cox stated that when the Elev-
enth Circuit originally decided that Peru had engaged in a commercial 
activity, it also decided that the requisite “direct effect” nexus also ex-
isted.56 Additionally, he cited the court’s previous holding that the indi-
vidual defendants named in the suits were not entitled to sovereign 
immunity, “‘because the sovereign itself is not.’”57 Although critical of 
the Eleventh Circuit’s apparent reversal of its own decision, Judge Cox 
also stated that rather than apply the FSIA, the court should have dis-
missed the suit under principles of international comity.58 Under that 
doctrine, he felt that the court should have recognized and respected 
the decision of the SHLC to not pay the reward as the final determina-
tion of the matter.59 
 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of the claim, Guevara 
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.60 The petition asserted 
that the circuits are evenly split as to the correct application of the FSIA 
direct effect analysis.61 Because of the various tests and interpretations, 
Guevara claimed that there is considerable uncertainty as to when 
courts should waive FSIA immunity.62 Additionally, Guevara stated the 
need for judicial enforcement of a reward on policy grounds.63 On No-
                                                                                                                      
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1311 (Cox, J., dissenting). 
56 See id. 
57 See id. (quoting Guevara I, 468 F.3d at 1305). 
58 Id. at 1313. 
59 Id. 
60 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 13. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 18. 
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vember 26, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certio-
rari.64 
II. Discussion 
A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
 The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is an ancient legal 
concept originally intended to protect foreign officials who conduct 
business abroad.65 The Supreme Court first established the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity in landmark case of Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don.66 In that case, Chief Justice Marshall held that no U.S. jurisdiction 
exists over a foreign sovereign absent the sovereign’s express consent.67 
The dicta of that opinion, however, suggested that immunity may be 
waived if the foreign sovereign acts as a private party.68 Many later 
courts applied the holding broadly and interpreted the decision “as 
extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns as ‘a matter 
of grace and comity.’”69 
 Following Schooner Exchange, the courts developed a two-step sys-
tem for making sovereign immunity determinations.70 Under this sys-
tem, a diplomatic representative from the foreign state could petition 
for a “suggestion of immunity” from the State Department, and upon 
such a suggestion the court would surrender jurisdiction.71 In the ab-
sence of a State Department request, the district courts could also make 
such an immunity determination themselves.72 As foreign states began 
to engage increasingly with private parties in international business, 
however, it became clear that the absolute application of immunity was 
no longer desirable.73 
                                                                                                                      
64 Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 131 S. Ct. 651 (2010) (mem.). 
65 Heidi L. Frostestad, Voest-Alpine Trading v. Bank of China: Can a Uniform Interpreta-
tion of a “Direct Effect” Be Attained Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976?, 34 
Val. U. L. Rev. 515, 520, 521 (2000). 
66 See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). 
67 Id. at 136. 
68 Morrissey, supra note 9, at 680. 
69 Samantar v. Yousef, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284 (2010) (quoting Verlinden B.V. v Cent. 
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1962)). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Frostestad, supra note 65, at 522–23. 
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 In 1952, the State Department halted its general practice of re-
questing sovereign immunity for all friendly sovereigns.74 That year, 
Jack Tate, the acting legal advisor to the State Department, announced 
that the department would adopt a “restrictive” theory of sovereign 
immunity.75 The restrictive theory of immunity, which many other 
countries had already adopted by the 1950s, recognized the role of the 
foreign state in international commerce and stripped immunity from 
suits where a foreign government acted in a commercial capacity.76 In 
recognizing the importance of the restrictive theory, Tate found that 
individuals engaged in business with foreign states needed the protec-
tion of a judicial remedy and therefore sovereign immunity must be 
waived in such instances.77 In 1976, Congress sought to codify the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity by enacting the FSIA.78 
 The FSIA has been described as a “statutory labyrinth” with “nu-
merous interpretative questions engendered by its bizarre structure 
and its many deliberately vague provisions.”79 Although the FSIA oper-
ates under the traditional premise that foreign governments are im-
mune from U.S. jurisdiction, it codifies specific exceptions, most sig-
nificantly the commercial activity exception inherent in the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity.80 The FSIA defines commercial activity 
as “either a regular course of commercial activity or a particular com-
mercial transaction or act.”81 In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., the 
Supreme Court held that “when a foreign government acts, not as 
regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it, 
the foreign sovereign’s actions are ‘commercial’ within the meaning of 
the FSIA.”82 This interpretation has been extended to include acts 
seemingly sovereign in nature, such as the national registration of air-
craft, if a foreign state contracts with a private company for assistance in 
such governmental functions.83 The federal courts have even extended 
the definition of commercial activity to include illegal conduct.84 This 
                                                                                                                      
74 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285. 
75 Morrissey, supra note 9, at 681–82. 
76 Frostestad, supra note 65, at 522–23. 
77 Morrissey, supra note 9, at 681–82. 
78 See Frostestad, supra note 65, at 524. 
79 Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
80 Morrissey, supra note 9, at 675, 676; see James A. Beckman, Citizens Without a Forum: The 
Lack of an Appropriate and Consistent Remedy for United States Citizens Injured or Killed as the Result 
of Activity Above the Territorial Air Space, 22 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 249, 265 (1999). 
81 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). 
82 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). 
83 Hond. Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Hond., 129 F.3d 543, 548 (11th Cir. 1997). 
84 See Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 875 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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interpretation stemmed from Justice White’s concurrence in Saudi Ara-
bia v. Nelson, in which he posited that torture of a plaintiff by govern-
ment hired thugs, rather than police, could be considered a commer-
cial activity.85 Not all circuits have been willing to follow such a broad 
interpretation of commercial activity, however, leaving the precise defi-
nition of the term uncertain.86 
  Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA establishes the commercial activity 
exception and provides three nexuses for waiver of immunity due to 
commercial activity.87 First, immunity is waived when “the action is 
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state.”88 Second, waiver applies when the suit is based “upon an 
act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere.”89 Finally, waiver occurs when a 
suit is based “upon an act outside the territory of the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere 
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.”90 Although the 
first and second nexuses do not explicitly define the commercial activ-
ity or “in connection with” requirements, it is the interpretation of the 
third nexus’s direct effect requirement that poses significant difficulty 
for the circuit courts.91 
 Almost immediately after the enactment of the FSIA, the circuit 
courts developed different interpretations of the direct effect clause.92 
Although most circuits required that a direct effect in the United States 
be “substantial and foreseeable,” others expressly rejected such a re-
quirement.93 The Supreme Court sought to address this split when it 
decided Weltover v. Argentina in 1992.94 In that case, bondholders sued 
the central bank of Argentina for altering a bond payment schedule 
outside of their preexisting contract.95 The Court examined whether 
                                                                                                                      
85 See 507 U.S. 349, 366 (1993) (White, J., concurring). 
86 Compare Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (re-
jecting a claim that Hezbollah kidnappers hired by Iran to kidnap Americans in Lebanon 
constituted a commercial activity under the FSIA), with Adler, 219 F.3d at 875 (holding that 
a contract to illegally obtain government funds and bribe officials constituted a commer-
cial activity). 
87 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Morrissey, supra note 9, at 676, 677. 
92 Id. at 683. 
93 Frostestad, supra note 65, at 527–28. 
94 Morrissey, supra note 9, at 684. 
95 Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. at 607. 
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the contractual breach that occurred in Argentina had a direct effect in 
the United States, thereby waiving Argentina’s FSIA immunity.96 The 
Court did not require any substantiality or foreseeability requirement 
and instead accepted the Second Circuit’s holding that “an effect is ‘di-
rect’ if it follows ‘as an immediate consequence of the defendant’s ac-
tivity.’”97 In applying this test, the Court held that because New York 
was the place of performance for Argentina’s payment obligations, the 
rescheduling of those obligations had the necessary direct effect in the 
United States.98 Finally, the Court also used the “minimum contacts” 
test99 for personal jurisdiction as an aid in interpreting the direct effect 
requirement.100 In that analysis, the Court found that because the 
bonds were payable in New York, Argentina had availed itself of the 
privilege of engaging in business in the United States and met the test’s 
requirements.101 
 Although Weltover established the “immediate consequence” test 
for the direct effect inquiry, some circuit courts continued to apply ad-
ditional means of analysis.102 One such test requires that a direct effect 
must be a “legally significant act” in the United States.103 Even after Wel-
tover failed to include such a requirement in its holding, some circuit 
courts continued to apply it, as the Second Circuit did in Antares Aircraft 
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.104 The Fifth Circuit rejected such a test in 
Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, when it held that the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Weltover represented an explicit rejection of 
any legally significant act requirement.105 The Fifth Circuit also held 
that while a legally significant act could cause a direct effect in the 
United States, it was not the only means of doing so.106 Although the 
Second Circuit eventually abandoned the test as well,107 the Eighth and 
                                                                                                                      
96 Id. at 609. 
97 Id. at 618; see Adler, 219 F.3d at 876 (applying Weltover and holding that reliance on 
fraudulent statements made outside the United States was an immediate consequence of 
defendant’s activity). 
98 Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. at 618–19. 
99 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
100 Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. at 619–20. 
101 See id. at 620. 
102 See Frostestad, supra note 65, at 529–30. 
103 See Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
104 See 999 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1993). 
105 142 F.3d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 1998). 
106 Id. 
107 See Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 602 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Tenth Circuits still employ the legally significant act requirement in 
their direct effect inquiry.108 
B. Unilateral Reward Contracts 
 When some aspect of a contract for the purchase of goods or ser-
vices occurs in the United States, and a foreign state is a party, it will 
likely meet the requirements for the waiver of immunity.109 Under 
modern contract law, a party can be legally bound by an offer, even ab-
sent any formal bargaining with another party.110 Such open offers are 
called unilateral contracts, and they represent an enforceable promise 
of consideration upon the performance of a requested act.111 Open 
reward and prize offers, whether for information leading to the arrest 
of a fugitive or for a successful hole in one in a golf tournament, are 
considered unilateral contracts.112 Unilateral contracts, and fugitive 
rewards in particular, can only be accepted through complete perform-
ance of the offer’s specific terms, and the offeror may also revoke the 
offer any time before performance is complete.113 
 The law governing rewards for assistance in the capture or arrest 
of wanted fugitives has developed over the centuries in U.S. courts.114 
Shuey v. United States involved a $25,000 reward offer for the arrest of 
John H. Suratt, an alleged conspirator in the assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln.115 Although President Andrew Johnson publicly revoked the 
reward offer, that revocation was unbeknownst to Henri Beaumont de 
Sainte Marie, an associate of Suratt’s.116 When Sainte Marie discovered 
Suratt hiding in Vatican City, he alerted the authorities and even ac-
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companied the U.S. Navy as it finally apprehended Suratt following his 
escape to Egypt.117 When Sainte Marie petitioned Ulysses S. Grant, the 
interim Secretary of War, for the $25,000 reward, he was denied on the 
grounds that the reward offer had been previously revoked.118 In the 
litigation that followed, Sainte Marie’s claim for the reward reached the 
Supreme Court.119 The Court held that regardless of a party’s reliance 
on such a reward offer, the offeror could validly revoke it any time be-
fore performance, even without the offeree’s knowledge of such revo-
cation.120 
 Some courts have come to understand the Supreme Court’s opin-
ion in Shuey as requiring the strict interpretation of the terms of a re-
ward offer.121 Under this view, if a reward is offered for the “arrest” of a 
fugitive, simply providing information leading to the arrest of that fugi-
tive does not satisfy the requested performance of the offer.122 Other 
courts have been more willing to interpret reward offers liberally, hold-
ing that providing information leading to an arrest is essentially the 
same as performing the act of arrest itself.123 
 Another unsettled area of the law governing reward offers is 
whether knowledge of the offer, prior to performance, is essential to 
recovery.124  Although some courts have ruled that knowledge of a re-
ward is essential to the formation of a unilateral contract, not every 
court has adhered to this principle.125 In Drummond v. United States, a 
private detective who successfully facilitated the arrest of an escaped fu-
gitive sought payment of a reward from both the U.S. Marshals and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).126 By examining both the purpose of a 
fugitive reward and other case law governing such offers, the Court of 
Federal Claims found that knowledge of a government reward offer is 
not necessary for recovery.127 The Municipal Court of Appeals found 
differently in Glover v. District of Columbia, when it held that a plaintiff 
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must prove knowledge of a reward offered by a government to prove the 
existence of a binding contract.128 Some courts have also acknowledged 
a possible distinction between governmental and private reward offers, 
with knowledge of such a reward only being required in the latter in-
stance.129 
 The law governing fugitive reward offers also draws a distinction 
between rewards offered through a proclamation and those offered 
pursuant to a government official’s statutory authorization.130 When a 
government offers a reward pursuant to a statute, the offer is subject to 
the terms of the statute rather than contract law.131 When a govern-
ment official has the authority to make reward offers independently, 
however, that authority equates to the power to enter the government 
into a binding contract.132 In Cornejo-Ortega v. United States, the Court of 
Federal Claims dismissed the claim of an individual who provided the 
whereabouts of a fugitive in Mexico who was wanted for kidnapping, 
robbery and the murder of a DEA agent.133 Although federal agents 
showed the plaintiff a reward poster with the fugitive’s name and pic-
ture, offering a “reward up to $2,200,000,” the court held that no valid 
unilateral contract existed because the agents did not have the author-
ity to enter the federal government into such a contract.134 Further-
more, the court found that the language used in the poster, which in-
cluded the words “up to,” provided no guarantee of any payment, since 
such phrasing may be interpreted “to include zero as its lower limit.”135 
 Rewards offered by private individuals are subject to the same con-
cepts of contract law that apply to rewards offered by governments or 
their agencies.136 In Norman v. Loomis Fargo & Co., the Western District 
of North Carolina held that when an armored car company publicized 
a $500,000 reward for information “that result[ed] in the capture of 
the perpetrators” of the theft of several million dollars, it created a uni-
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lateral contract.137 The court further found that the plaintiff met the 
requirement of acceptance of the reward offer when she phoned in her 
information to the America’s Most Wanted tip line.138 In Guevara, the 
Eleventh Circuit also acknowledged the prevalence of private reward 
offers, such as an offer made by Oprah Winfrey’s television show for 
information relating to child predators or O.J. Simpson’s personal re-
ward offer for information on the whereabouts of the “real killers.”139 
In examining such private reward offers, the court found that such ac-
tivity equated to the purchase of information on the open market by a 
private party.140 
 Law enforcement agencies all over the world commonly employ 
the use of rewards to encourage public assistance in locating fugi-
tives.141 In 1984, Congress approved the use of cash rewards under the 
Act to Combat International Terrorism.142 This legislation led to the 
formation of the Rewards for Justice Program, which allows the Secre-
tary of State to offer rewards in excess of $25 million for information 
that prevents terrorist acts against U.S. persons or property world-
wide.143 
 Other countries offer similar rewards for fugitives accused of vari-
ous criminal acts, such as war crimes, drug offenses and murder.144 Be-
fore his unassisted capture in May of 2011, the government of Serbia 
had offered a cash reward of €10 million for information leading to the 
arrest of accused war criminal Ratko Mladic, wanted for orchestrating 
the Srebrenica massacre in 1995.145 As the Government of Mexico con-
tinues to battle with the drug cartels that operate in the country, it has 
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offered rewards of $2 million dollars for information leading to the ar-
rest of various high level drug lords.146 In February of 2011, the Gov-
ernment of Greece offered a €1 million reward for assistance in the 
capture of kidnapper and suspected terrorist Vassilis Paleokostas, who 
recently escaped the same maximum security prison via helicopter for 
the second time.147 While these lucrative reward offers are used to assist 
in the capture of the most notorious and dangerous fugitives, foreign 
governments also offer smaller rewards to solicit information on less 
notable criminals.148 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police offers 
smaller rewards for information about its most wanted fugitives, such as 
the $17,500 offered for assistance in the arrest of a triple murder sus-
pect in British Columbia.149 
C. Current Joint Law Enforcement and Security Operations Between the United 
States and Foreign States 
 Increased global security concerns following the September 11th 
terrorist attacks have ushered in an era of formal partnerships between 
the United States and foreign governments.150 In order to provide 
greater border security between the United States and Canada, both 
governments have established Integrated Border Enforcement Teams 
(IBETs).151 These units, located at various border points of entry, are 
intended to combat national security threats and thwart organized 
crime through a partnership between various agencies such as the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and U.S. Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE).152 
 A similar program, the Mérida Initiative, exists between the United 
States and Mexico.153 Established by Congress in 2007, the Mérida Ini-
tiative has provided more than $1 billion to assist the Mexican govern-
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ment in combating the drug violence plaguing the border areas.154 The 
stated purpose of the Mérida Initiative is to disrupt organized crime 
syndicates that operate between both countries, as well as strengthen 
the communities and institutions needed to improve security.155 In ad-
dition to funding the Partnership, the United States also currently of-
fers multi-million dollar rewards for information leading to the arrest of 
top cartel leaders.156 
 The United States also assists in security and anti-terrorist partner-
ships well beyond its North American borders.157 In order to combat 
the various security threats operating in the Philippines, such as the Al 
Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the United States has provided 
non-combat military support to the region.158 American advisors have 
also assisted in the training and development of the Philippine Na-
tional Police.159 After the kidnapping of two American missionaries by 
ASG operatives, the U.S. Department of Justice offered rewards of up to 
$5 million for information leading to arrest or conviction of the mem-
bers of the organization.160 The reward offers proved effective, and in 
2007 the U.S. government paid $10 million to a group of Filipino citi-
zens who provided information that resulted in the capture of two 
high-ranking ASG members.161 The successes of the U.S. Rewards for 
Justice program have inspired the Philippine Congress to propose a bill 
establishing a similar rewards program under the Philippine Depart-
ment of Justice.162 Under this proposed legislation, the Secretary of 
Justice could offer rewards of up to 5 million pesos, roughly $115,000, 
for information leading to the capture or arrest of wanted terror sus-
pects.163 
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III. Analysis 
A. FSIA Immunity Should Not Allow the Contractual Obligations  
of Foreign States to Be Avoided 
 While the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Guevara on the grounds of 
FSIA immunity, according to the facts of the case the plaintiff still met 
all of the requirements for a binding unilateral contract under U.S. 
contract law.164 Unlike the federal agents in Cornejo-Ortega, the Presi-
dent of Peru was acting within the scope of his authority when he is-
sued the decree establishing the reward.165 Guevara, having learned of 
the reward while in F.B.I. custody, provided this information as a direct 
result of Peru’s promise of compensation.166 Finally, as the district court 
acknowledged in its summary judgment, Guevara’s information directly 
resulted in Montesinos’ capture, thereby fulfilling the requested per-
formance of the Emergency Decree.167 Because Guevara had met all of 
the requirements for formation of a binding unilateral contract, in the 
absence of FSIA immunity the reward offer would have been enforce-
able under American law. 168 
 The willingness of U.S. courts to liberally interpret reward offers 
and enforce obligations to pay such rewards illustrates the need for judi-
cial protection of such agreements.169 The important policy considera-
tions behind maintaining the integrity of a unilateral contract make it 
precisely the type of claim the commercial activity exception is supposed 
to make available against foreign states.170 The FSIA was intended to 
maintain the enforceability of contracts between private parties and for-
eign states by providing a remedy in U.S. courts in the event of a 
breach.171 Because of the personal risks assumed by an informant in 
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providing information to law enforcement, the legally binding promise 
of compensation must be vigorously protected by courts, even against 
foreign states.172 When a foreign state enters the market as a private 
party, it must be made subject to the same obligations of private indi-
viduals after the formation a contract.173 In Guevara, the Emergency De-
cree was silent on jurisdiction and did not specify any forum for disputes 
arising from the offer.174 Because of its role as the offeror, Peru was free 
to include an arbitration or forum selection clause if it wished to be free 
from the possibility of adjudication or enforcement of the offer in the 
U.S. courts.175 Allowing a state to claim FSIA immunity, after it has failed 
to address jurisdictional concerns in its contract, goes beyond the de-
fenses afforded to a private party and therefore runs counter to the 
purpose of the commercial activity exception.176 
B. Application of the FSIA Commercial Activity Exception to Reward Offers 
 While the Eleventh Circuit found that the first two nexuses of the 
commercial activity exception did not apply to the reward offer in 
Guevara, that may not be true for every reward offered by a foreign 
state.177 The first nexus, which waives immunity when a foreign state 
partakes in a commercial activity in the United States, could potentially 
be satisfied in the context of a fugitive reward offer.178 In Guevara, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that because the Special High Level Committee 
which oversaw the offer was based in Peru, and the $5 million of reward 
money lay in a Peruvian escrow account, no part of the commercial ac-
tivity was carried on in the United States.179 Under this holding, if Peru 
had sent its own law enforcement agents to Miami to evaluate Guevara’s 
information or had arranged for payment of the reward through a U.S. 
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bank account, such commercial activity might be considered as having 
occurred in the United States, satisfying the first jurisdictional nexus.180 
Also, while the court found that publishing the reward through an offi-
cial Peruvian website maintained the sovereign nature of the offer out-
side the United States, active promotion of a reward in a U.S. based 
publication or media outlet may also meet the requirements for waiver 
of immunity under the first nexus.181 
 While the offer in Guevara failed to meet the requirements of the 
second nexus, which waives immunity in suits based upon an act in the 
United States “in connection with a commercial activity elsewhere,” un-
der different circumstances a foreign state’s actions might meet this re-
quirement.182 Reluctant to expand the scope of the second nexus, the 
Eleventh Circuit was unwilling to find that the single phone call by a Pe-
ruvian official to the FBI in Miami was sufficiently “in connection with” 
the commercial activity of the reward offer.183 In doing so, the court 
noted that to allow for such a discrete act to constitute waiver of sover-
eign immunity would violate the principle that immunity may only be 
waived either by explicit or implicit waiver.184 Although the court failed 
to articulate what types of acts would establish a proper waiver, it appears 
that greater communication between Peruvian and U.S. authorities, or 
greater direct contact with an informant in the United States, might be 
adequately “in connection with” the commercial activity.185 
  In a situation like Guevara, where most of the reward-related activ-
ity occurs within the offering country, the third nexus’s direct effect 
inquiry represents the most appropriate test for a FSIA determina-
tion.186 Just as the Peruvian government independently administered 
and managed the Montesinos reward offer within their borders, so to 
do other countries seeking information on a wanted fugitive.187 For 
instance, the proposed “Rewards for Information Concerning Terror-
ism Program” in the Philippines would grant the Philippine Depart-
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ment of Justice the discretion to authorize and administer rewards in a 
fashion similar to Peru’s SHLC.188 Similarly, the Serbian government 
allocated the €10 million reward for accused war criminal Ratko Mladic 
in much the same way Peru placed its reward funds in escrow.189 Be-
cause the locus of the commercial activity, and any acts in connection 
with it, remain within the offering country in these instances, the direct 
effect nexus is the most applicable FSIA analysis for such reward of-
fers.190 
 When a reward offer is subject to the direct effect analysis, it 
should also be subject to the various tests the courts use when applying 
the third nexus to other forms of contracts.191 In Weltover, the Supreme 
Court interpreted a direct effect as one that follows “as an immediate 
consequence of the defendant’s . . . activity.”192 The Court held that 
waiver of FSIA immunity occurred when the Argentinean government’s 
failure to pay out its bonds in New York City had a direct effect in the 
United States.193 While a reward offer is unlike the bond agreement at 
issue in Weltover, it still becomes a binding contract once the informant 
provides the information and the requested performance is com-
pleted.194 Although a reward logically occurs as a direct result of the 
offer’s existence, an informant provides information to the authorities 
as an immediate consequence of the offer.195 Although the Eleventh 
Circuit failed to directly apply this test in Guevara, because a person 
provides the requested information as an immediate consequence of 
the promised compensation, acceptance of a reward offer should meet 
the requirements of a direct effect under Weltover.196 
 Rather than solely applying the language of the Weltover holding to 
Guevara, the Eleventh Circuit instead relied on the Second Circuit’s 
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interpretation of the test.197 In Harris Co. v. National Iranian Radio & 
Television, the Second Circuit interpreted Weltover as requiring that that 
a direct effect be “sufficiently” in the United States, as well as have “sig-
nificant, foreseeable financial consequences [in the United States].”198 
In applying this interpretation to Guevara, the Eleventh Circuit found 
the plaintiff’s only “acceptance-related activity” was a single phone call 
between U.S. and Peruvian authorities to which Guevara was not a 
party.199 This analysis of Guevara’s acceptance, however, does not con-
sider the basic nature of a unilateral contract.200 The Eleventh Circuit 
failed to recognize that under the law of unilateral contract, when 
Guevara provided the information to the FBI and completed perform-
ance of the requested task, he accepted the offer.201 When the circuit 
court applied Harris’s financial consequence requirement, it also failed 
to consider the use of FBI resources for the capture of Montesinos as a 
“significant, foreseeable financial consequence” of the reward offer.202 
Because Peru’s reward offer resulted in the coordinated actions of sev-
eral FBI agents over multiple days, the use of those agents likely repre-
sented a significant financial burden to the U.S. government.203 
 Although the Supreme Court in Weltover expressly renounced the 
addition of “unexpressed requirements” to the direct effect clause, 
some circuits apply additional tests, such as the legally significant act 
and the substantial and foreseeable tests.204 Although these tests are 
intended to clarify and narrow the scope of the commercial activity ex-
ception, the Eleventh Circuit failed to apply them in Guevara, ignoring 
many of the other circuits’ means of FSIA analysis.205 
 The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its use of a “substantial and foresee-
able” requirement in America West Airlines v. GPA Group, where a U.S. 
based purchaser of aircraft sued the national airline of Ireland for 
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damages sustained from the faulty service of a jet engine.206 Because 
the repairs only occurred in Ireland at the direction of one of the con-
tracting parties, the court found that U.S. contacts to the Irish govern-
ment were “purely fortuitous” and were not substantial or foreseeable 
enough to create a direct effect.207 That decision relied heavily on the 
fact that the Irish entity servicing the engine was unaware that the air-
craft would be used in the United States.208 In Guevara, however, the 
Peruvian government was in contact with the FBI during its pursuit of 
Montesinos and knew it was dealing with an informant in FBI custody 
in Miami.209 Any time a foreign state knowingly forms a contract for 
information with a party located in the United States, and also coordi-
nates apprehension efforts with U.S. authorities, there can be no claim 
that the U.S. connection was purely fortuitous.210 
 The application of the legally significant act test arose as a result of 
the apparent vagueness of Weltover’s immediate consequence test.211 
The Supreme Court seemingly affirmed its use when it followed the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Weltover to “‘look to the place where legally 
significant acts giving rise to the claim occurred.’”212 Because some cir-
cuits feared that a liberal interpretation of the direct effect require-
ment might turn U.S. courts into “international court[s] of claims”, the 
legally significant act test provides a much narrower standard for waiver 
of immunity.213 Under this standard, U.S. courts are able to enforce the 
contractual obligations of foreign states, while still requiring more than 
a tenuous connection to the United States to establish waiver of immu-
nity.214 
 Pursuant to its holding in United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil 
Production Ass’n., the Tenth Circuit still employs the legally significant 
act requirement in its direct effect analysis.215 In that case, the circuit 
court found that a breach of contract had no direct effect in the United 
States because “no part of the contract . . . was to be performed in the 
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United States.”216 In Guevara, however, the plaintiff established per-
formance of the unilateral contract in the United States when he pro-
vided the requested information to the FBI in Miami.217 When accep-
tance of a reward offer in the United States creates a binding contract, 
it meets the requirements of the test because performance of a contract 
in the United States is a legally significant act.218 Despite the fears of 
some courts, application of the legally significant act test to reward 
claims would do little to expand the scope of the direct effect excep-
tion, because it would be limited to instances like Guevara, where per-
formance in the United States has created a binding contract between 
an informant and a foreign state.219 
  Some courts also employ a personal jurisdiction, minimum con-
tacts analysis as an aid in determining the sufficiency of a direct ef-
fect.220 In Weltover, the Supreme Court found the Government of Argen-
tina “‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the [United States].’”221 When the court in Guevara per-
formed a similar analysis, it found that a single telephone call was not 
sufficient to establish minimum contacts.222 What the Guevara court 
failed to recognize, however, was that the Government of Peru purpose-
fully availed itself of assistance from the FBI in the United States and 
abroad when it solicited the information from Guevara.223 Although the 
record reflects that only one phone call occurred between Peruvian and 
U.S. agents in Miami, in that call Peru willingly accepted the assistance 
of federal law enforcement in obtaining and relaying the information 
regarding Montesinos’ whereabouts.224 Peru openly acknowledged the 
assistance of the FBI in securing Montesinos’ capture and implicitly ac-
knowledged that the reward would likely be granted to the FBI infor-
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mant.225 Such purposeful availment of U.S. resources goes far beyond 
any “‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts” with the United 
States.226 
 While courts have applied various tests and interpretations to the 
commercial activity exception of the FSIA, the core purpose of the pro-
vision remains the same: if a foreign sovereign participates in private 
commercial activity, it should not be granted foreign sovereign immu-
nity.227 The purchase of information, whether it is the location of a 
dangerous fugitive or a consumer’s credit report, remains a commercial 
exchange that occurs among private parties on a daily basis.228 Just as 
the private company in Loomis Fargo Co. entered a contract with a pri-
vate party for information regarding a robbery, so too did Peru engage 
with a private individual to locate the country’s most notorious fugi-
tive.229 Although courts apply numerous interpretations and tests to the 
direct effect clause of the FSIA, all are intended to ensure that waiver of 
immunity occurs only when a foreign sovereign performs a commercial 
activity that affects the United States.230 Rather than simplify the al-
ready confusing doctrine, the final Guevara decision only further com-
plicates the FSIA analysis by recognizing that Peru engaged in a com-
mercial activity with a party in the United States, yet still failed to meet 
the requirements for waiver of immunity.231 
C. The Inapplicability of the International Comity Doctrine to Reward Offers 
 In his dissenting opinion in Guevara, Judge Cox recognized that 
the requirements of the commercial activity exception should have 
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waived FSIA immunity, but also suggested that the claim should be 
dismissed based on the “doctrine of international comity.”232 In Hilton 
v. Guyot, the Supreme Court defined international comity as “the rec-
ognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citi-
zens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”233 
Judge Cox stated that the Peruvian Government’s decision to withhold 
the reward from Guevara should be respected on the grounds of inter-
national comity and not be questioned through litigation in the United 
States.234 The use of the comity doctrine to abstain from hearing a case 
is based on the principle that a judgment issued by a foreign nation 
should be recognized in U.S. courts.235 In Guevara, however, Peru’s de-
cision to withhold the reward came only through the Department of 
the Interior’s SHLC, without any adjudication by a Peruvian court. 236 
The abstention doctrine generally is applied only when a judgment has 
been rendered by a competent foreign court employing principles of 
civilized jurisprudence.237 Invocation of the international comity doc-
trine is improper in cases such as Guevara, where a plaintiff seeks to en-
force a contract with a foreign state and there has not been a parallel 
judicial proceeding in that state.238 
 Courts also invoke the international comity doctrine out of con-
cern that litigation would strain the “amicable working relationships” 
between the United States and a foreign sovereign.239 In the case of 
Guevara, concern over damaging relations with Peru is unwarranted 
given the amount of support the United States already provides in pur-
suing Peru’s most dangerous fugitives.240 The State Department cur-
rently offers rewards of up to $5 million, an amount identical to Peru’s 
offer for Montesinos, for information leading to the arrest of two 
                                                                                                                      
232 Id. at 1313. 
233 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895). 
234 See Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1313 (Cox, J., dissenting). 
235 See Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994). 
236 See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Guevara v. Republic of 
Peru, No. 10-389 (Oct. 22, 2010). 
237 See Turner Entm’t Co., 25 F.3d at 1519. 
238 See id. 
239 Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Con-
flict of Laws, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 11, 14 (2010). 
240 See Narcotics Rewards Program: Florindo Eleuterio Flores-Hala, U.S. Dep’t State, http:// 
www.state.gov/j/inl/narc/rewards/144800.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2012); Narcotics Re-
wards Program: Victor Quispe Palomino, U.S. Dep’t State, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/narc/ 
rewards/144801.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
2012] Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Foreign Reward Offers 249 
members of the “Shining Path,” a Peruvian terrorist group.241 Because 
the United States remains a leading provider of large cash rewards for 
information regarding the world’s most dangerous criminals, enforce-
ment of another state’s reward offer would not strain the strong work-
ing relationships already in place between the United States and its 
partners in global security.242 
D. The Harm Resulting from Failing to Enforce Foreign Reward Offers 
 At the most basic level, failure to find waiver of FSIA immunity in a 
reward offer would permit a foreign state to bargain for information but 
not pay for it, allowing for unjust enrichment.243 In Guevara, Peru en-
tered the market like any private party and sought to purchase informa-
tion on Montesinos’ whereabouts through a unilateral contract.244 Fail-
ure to enforce a foreign state’s obligation to pay such a reward allows 
that state to “shift to the [plaintiff] its ordinary marketplace obligations 
for the . . . services that plaintiff . . . furnish[ed].”245 Just as the Supreme 
Court found that the FSIA direct effect clause protected the contractual 
interests of Swiss and Panamanian bondholders, so too should individu-
als, who undertake tremendous personal risk and assist in the capture of 
dangerous fugitives, have their contractual interests protected.246 Failure 
to do so would simply allow a foreign government to contract for and 
receive a valuable service like any private party but leave it with no legal 
obligation to pay for it.247 
 The United States adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity in part because it was no longer claiming immunity in contract 
or tort claims in foreign courts, and it was therefore unfair to allow 
other foreign states to do so.248 This concept of reciprocity should also 
apply to the commercial activity of fugitive reward offers.249 Since its 
inception, the Rewards for Justice Program has paid over $100 million 
to sixty informants for information they provided to assist in the cap-
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ture the world’s most wanted criminals.250 The intelligence procured by 
these substantial reward offers has resulted in the capture of actors pos-
ing serious threats to both U.S. and international security, such as 
Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 
and Edgar Navarro, the commander of the FARC rebels in Colum-
bia.251 In most of these cases the informants were located outside the 
United States and the Department of Justice readily delivered on its 
promise to provide millions of dollars to foreign nationals for their ser-
vice.252 To allow a foreign state to avoid payment of its obligations, 
while the United States honors its own, violates the FSIA’s underlying 
principles of reciprocity.253 While reward offers may be a unique form 
of contract, allowing a state to renege on a reward payment obligation 
“would jeopardize not only its vital interests but those of every country 
that offers rewards for information, including [the United States].”254 
 In addition to the fundamental unfairness of allowing an offering 
state to violate contract law while the United States meets the same ob-
ligations abroad, failure to provide legal protection to informants could 
have adverse effects on U.S. law enforcement.255 Paid informants are a 
crucial tool used to infiltrate major criminal operations, and such re-
ward offers provide the motivation for key witnesses to come for-
ward.256 In a situation like Guevara’s, where a federal law enforcement 
agency deals directly with an informant, it is of paramount importance 
that the informant retain a level of trust in the government agency to 
ensure that further information will be provided.257 
 The existing partnerships between the United States and Mexico, 
Canada, and the Philippines create an opportunity for informants to 
come forward to U.S. authorities with information on serious criminal 
activity, in a situation similar to that in Guevara.258 Because informants 
are quite often involved in illegal activity themselves, it seems quite 
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likely that a suspect in U.S. custody could have valuable information 
regarding criminal activity abroad.259 Under the collaborative police 
efforts currently in place, U.S law enforcement is also likely to rely on 
foreign reward offers as a tool in soliciting information, just as the FBI 
did in Guevara.260 If an informant in the United States was motivated to 
come forward to federal authorities because of a foreign state’s lucra-
tive reward offer and the offering state refused payment, the credibility 
of federal law enforcement among informants would be severely com-
promised.261 Because “the promise of a reward means little or nothing 
to an informant if the country offering the reward cannot be made to 
pay it,” continued participation of informants in our collaborative law 
enforcement operations requires that such rewards must be made en-
forceable in U.S. courts.262 Given the vital role that informants play in 
the criminal justice system, especially those who provide information 
crucial to both U.S. and international security—the FSIA must be in-
terpreted in a way that protects their interests.263 
Conclusion 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Guevara both muddied 
the waters of FSIA jurisprudence and undermined a valuable tool em-
ployed by law enforcement all over the world. Congress intended the 
FSIA to provide U.S. jurisdiction when a foreign state breaches its obli-
gations in a commercial contract. Reward offers are a recognized form 
of contract that simply equates to the purchase of information through 
the promise of compensation. When a foreign state offers rewards for 
information regarding a wanted fugitive, an informant in the United 
States creates a binding contract when he or she provides that informa-
tion. The creation of such a contract, especially when it is formed 
through the assistance of U.S. authorities, undoubtedly has the requi-
site direct effect on the United States to waive sovereign immunity. It is 
imperative that these contracts, when performed in the United States, 
receive the protection of U.S. courts as the FSIA intended. As a partner 
in global security, the United States must be able to rely on reward of-
fers from other countries when it solicits information regarding dan-
gerous international fugitives. Because rewards are only as effective as 
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they are enforceable, allowing a foreign state to avoid its contractual 
obligations weakens this important law enforcement tool. 
